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Abstract: Overwhelmingly, Canadian-born children 
relinquished for newborn adoption have been born to 
unmarried mothers. Under provincial adoption acts, in cases of 
‘illegitimacy’ only the mother’s consent was necessary for a 
child to be eligible for adoption. Since adoption statutes were 
introduced, however, the distinctions between those born 
within and outside of marriage have been eliminated at law. 
Provincial legislation now recognizes a wide range of 
unmarried men as fathers, lists circumstances under which 
paternity will be presumed and provides for the use of genetic 
testing. But this raises significant questions in the context of 
newborn adoption. Whose consent is required to relinquish a 
child? In this paper it is argued that the unfettered right to 
release a newborn child for third party adoption is an essential 
component of women’s reproductive autonomy. It is also 
essential to women’s dignity and equality rights, and to the 
right to liberty and security of the person. To illustrate this 
argument, consent provisions are contextualized by explicating 
the disrespect for unmarried birth mothers that has been 
central to adoption regimes. This is contrasted with the 
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expanding rights of non-marital fathers under Charter 
litigation. With regard to newborn adoption, Charter reasoning 
has delivered equality with a vengeance. Relinquishment 
should be considered an issue of reproductive freedom, not a 
question of custody. Interference in the birth mother’s decision 
making process violates her s.15 right to equality; the on-going 
poverty and discrimination faced by single mothers are erased 
when the genetic claims of men are considered to give them 
equal standing with mothers in adoption cases. Moreover, 
women’s s.7 rights to liberty and security of the person are 
vitiated when men can interfere with adoption placement, 




Adoption is a statutory invention that allows a child to become 
the full legal child of a non-biological parent.1 Historically, and 
in the public mind, adoption was believed to be an altruistic 
mechanism for ‘saving’ unfortunate children; as Karen 
Dubinsky argues, “ideologies and images of rescue”2 are 
                                                
1  Adoption has a long informal history. Moreover, statutory adoption is 
used in contexts beyond that explored in this article: newborn 
adoption by strangers. It is common for step-parents to adopt the 
biological children of their partners and adoption is used in same-sex 
families and surrogacy cases to formalize intentional parenthood 
decisions. 
2  Karen Dubinsky, Babies Without Borders: Adoption and Migration 
Across the Americas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 
95. While she makes this argument only in regard to international 
adoption, it is equally relevant in the domestic context. The trope of 
rescue has been challenged, as she also illustrates, particularly in the 
international context, by horror stories of child-kidnapping and baby 
selling. While there is no doubt that women have been subjected to 
pressure in the adoption context, and that extra-legal schemes for 
stealing babies have been an on-going problem, it is a foundational 




foundational to adoption practice. But from what and from 
whom were (and are) children to be saved? What children 
would be available for adoption and under what conditions? 
Overwhelmingly, Canadian-born children relinquished for 
newborn adoption have been born to unmarried mothers. Under 
provincial adoption acts, in cases of ‘illegitimacy’ only the 
mother’s consent was necessary for a child to be eligible for 
adoption. Since adoption statutes were introduced, however, 
the distinctions between those born within and outside of 
marriage have been eliminated at law.3 Provincial legislation 
now recognizes a wide range of unmarried men as fathers, lists 
circumstances under which paternity will be presumed, and 
provides for the use of genetic testing.4 But this raises 
significant questions in the context of newborn adoption.5 
                                                                                           
important option for birth mothers and that it can be good for birth 
mothers, their children and adoptive families.  
3  In Ontario, for example, affiliation proceedings were abolished on 
March 31, 1978 and the legal designation ‘illegitimate’ was made 
obsolete in 1980. See: Diana Dzwiekowski, “Casenotes: Findings of 
Paternity in Ontario, Sayer v. Rollin” (1980) 3 Can J Fam L 318 and 
Family Law Reform Act, RSO (1980), c 152, s 1(a). The intent of 
such reforms was clearly ameliorative: “the CLRA was intended to 
remove disabilities suffered by children born outside of 
marriage…The (Ontario Law Reform) Commission therefore 
‘accorded high priority to finding a means by which the child born 
outside marriage may be allowed to enjoy the same rights and 
privileges as other children in our society’. The Commission's central 
recommendation was that Ontario should abolish the concepts of 
legitimacy and illegitimacy and declare positively that all children 
have equal status in law. The Commission's recommendations were 
enacted into legislation in the form of Parts I and II of the CLRA:” 
AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2 at para 20. 
4  Ontario, Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO (1990), c C.12, ss 1-77.  
5  Most provincial birth registries and vital statistics provisions still 
allow the mother to register an infant alone, but registration is subject 
to revision, even against the will of the mother. For further 
information on vital statistics and the registration of birth, see: 
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Alberta, Vital Statistics Act, Alta Reg 322/2000, s 2.1; British 
Columbia, Vital Statistics Act, BC Reg 69/82, s 4; Manitoba, Vital 
Statistics Act, CCSM, c V60, s 3, enacted as RSM 1987, c V60; New 
Brunswick, Vital Statistics Act, NB Reg 87-30; Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Vital Statistics Act, SNL 2009, c V-6.01; Northwest 
Territories, Vital Statistics Act, RSNWT 1988, c V-3, ss 1-11; Nova 
Scotia, Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494; Ontario, Vital 
Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V.4, ss 8-17; Prince Edward Island, Vital 
Statistics Act, RSPEI 1988, c V-4.1; Saskatchewan, Vital Statistics 
Act, SS 2009, c V-7.21; Yukon, Vital Statistics Act, RSY 2002, c 225, 
ss 1-15. Social service agencies are increasingly concerned with the 
identification of the father in order to ensure his consent and a smooth 
adoption process; questioning of the mother, therefore, may be 
invasive. In some American states, this potential arises because “the 
state’s use of ‘due diligence’ to locate the putative father may result 
in a violation of the unwed mother’s privacy by breaking the 
confidential communication the woman shares with the state agent or 
the court:” Cecily Helms & Phyllis Spence, “Take Notice Unwed 
Fathers: An Unwed Mother’s Right to Privacy in Adoption 
Proceedings” (2005) 20 Wis Women’s LJ 1 at 13. Some provinces 
have adopted birth father or paternity registries that automatically 
entitle a registered father to notice if the mother seeks third party 
adoption. For example, British Columbia employs a birth father 
registry. Notice of proceedings, however, does not automatically 
translate into a requirement that a father consent to adoption. This is 
governed under the Adoption Act. The act requires some level of 
involvement from a father before his consent will be required, but is 
subject to significant judicial discretion: Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 
5, s 1, Part 2 – The Process Leading to Adoption. As this article will 
illustrate, however, even careful wording of adoption statutes does 
not preclude interference by an uninvolved unwed father who claims 
discrimination under the Charter. In Saskatchewan, the Children’s 
Law Act provides that “where the parents have never cohabited after 
the birth of the child, the parent with whom the child resides is the 
sole custodian of the child:” The Children’s Law Act, SS 1997, c C-
8.2, s 3(2). A challenge under section seven of the Charter was 
dismissed in 2004: Giles v Beisel, [2006] 2 WWR 724. Nonetheless, 
in 2004, the Adoption Amendment Act was passed; exceptions are 
available and an ex parte application can be made to dispense with 




Whose consent is required to relinquish a child? Must the 
mother notify the father when she becomes pregnant or reveal 
his name to social service agencies? Should the mother and 
father have equal rights to determine the future of a newborn 
child? These legal issues have not been definitively resolved.  
 
I argue that the unfettered right to release a newborn 
child for third party adoption is an essential component of 
women’s reproductive autonomy. It is also essential to 
women’s dignity and equality rights, and to the right to liberty 
and security of the person. A mother forced to notify a father 
might feel, for the sake of the infant, that she has no option but 
to discontinue adoption proceedings and retain custody against 
the father.6 She should not be forced to retain custody when she 
wishes, for personal reasons, to release a child to a third party. 
Moreover, a mother afraid of such a scenario might be more 
likely to undergo an abortion or reverse the adoption process. 
No woman should feel compelled to abort when such action is 
“contrary to her beliefs, moral principles, or health concerns.”7  
 
As the only person who has provided care for the child, 
the mother’s wishes for the child’s future must be respected. 
                                                                                           
of conception resulting from rape or incest,” but it seems that 
otherwise a mother must tell a father of her pregnancy. 
6  These fears/problems are recognized in safe haven legislation in most 
American states that allows a mother to abandon a baby, immediately 
after birth, without having to reveal her identity or that of the father, 
without fearing prosecution. There is, of course, an inconsistency in 
allowing abandonment through such channels, but insisting that a 
mother who does not so abandon her child must name the father. Safe 
haven legislation, however, is believed to prevent unsafe 
abandonment and infanticide. See: Susan Ayers, “Kairos and Safe 
Havens: The Timing and Calamity of an Unwanted Birth” (2009) 
15(2) Wm & Mary J Women & Law  227.  
7  Nancy Erickson, “The Feminist Dilemma Over Unwed Parents’ 
Custody Rights” (1984) 2 Law and Inequality 447 at 455.  
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Relinquishing a child for adoption has to be viewed as an act of 
love, “as the last in a series of actions meant to provide care for 
the child, not as an act of abandonment that gives her no 
interest in the child’s placement.”8 The mother who carries a 
child to term has made a conscious choice to parent by 
continuing her pregnancy. The father has made no parallel 
sacrifices.9 Women who find themselves pregnant without 
supportive partners, still almost exclusively those who 
contemplate third party adoption, face a myriad of difficult 
decisions throughout pregnancy. A woman cannot make a fully 
informed and free decision to carry a child to term if she must 
fear the intervention of an ex-lover in the disposition of the 
child post-birth. Based upon an exhaustive study of all extant 
reported cases with regard to consent to newborn adoption in 
English-Canada,10 I suggest that consent provisions have too 
                                                
8  Mary Shanley, “Fathers’ Rights, Mothers’ Wrongs?: Reflections on 
Unwed Fathers’ Rights and Sex Equality” in Uma Narayan & Julia 
Bartkowiak, eds, Having and Raising Children: Unconventional 
Families, Hard Choices and the Social Good (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) 39 at 59. 
9  It can be argued that [some] men have played a supportive role. The 
mother, in my view, may choose to recognize such support by 
inviting the father [or some other involved and supportive third party] 
into the baby’s life, but she should not be obligated to accept the 
involvement of a man who may deem himself supportive but who, to 
the mother, may appear controlling and interfering.  
10  The sample consists of 284 reported cases dating from 1948 to 2010. 
Exhaustive QUICKLAW searches were undertaken. All provinces 
and territories are represented except Quebec (although there are 
revocation cases extant in that province). Quebec’s history is very 
different due to the civil law tradition. Interestingly, Quebec is also 
the first province to attempt to grapple with social vs. genetic 
parenting claims. See: Robert Leckey, “Where the Parents Are of the 
Same Sex: Quebec’s Reforms to Filiation” (2009) 23 Int’l JL Policy 
& Fam 62. British Columbia is also now undertaking a complete 
revision of parentage legislation. For further information, see: British 




often disrespected mothers and devalued their gestational labor. 
Insult is added to injury when men are accorded rights over 
women’s bodies through purely genetic claims. The 
relinquishment of the child at birth is a reproductive decision 
that should be controlled exclusively by the mother.11 Allowing 
men to override the decisions of women reduces mothers to 
incubators and violates women’s rights under section 15 and 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(“Charter”).12  
                                                                                           
Civil Policy and Legislation Office, “White Paper on Family 
Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a New Family Law Act”, 
(Vancouver: Ministry of the Attorney-General, 2010), online: 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/legislation/pdf/Family-Law-WhitePaper.pd 
f>. All provinces are represented, but this article does not engage in 
statistical analysis of outcomes, and acknowledges that judicial 
discretion allows for significant variation in adoption consent cases. 
However, this discretion is itself dangerous for the reasons that 
follow. Strong patterns and themes were evident in these cases, as 
explained below, and particular cases were selected for extended 
analysis because they illustrate the problems that women can face 
under this unclear/contradictory legal regime. It is also of note that 
reported cases themselves are a limited historical/legal source. As 
with other aspects of family law, many cases regarding adoption are 
heard in courts which do not routinely report their findings, and 
patterns of decision-making ‘on-the-ground’ may not reflect the 
values and problems evident in reported cases. For an extended 
discussion of the differences between reported and unreported cases, 
see: Lori Chambers, Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the 
Ontario Children of Unmarried Parents Act, 1921-1969 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007). Nonetheless, reported cases are 
important because of their ‘educational’ impact on lawyers, judges 
and the public.  
11  It must be noted here that this argument applies only to newborn 
adoption.  
12  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11, s 15 and s 7 [Charter].  
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To illustrate this argument, consent provisions are 
contextualized by explicating the disrespect for unmarried birth 
mothers that has been central to adoption regimes. This is 
contrasted with the expanding rights of non-marital fathers 
under Charter litigation. Part I of this article explores the 
passage of adoption legislation and the rights of birth mothers. 
The baby was a desirable commodity and the mother was 
treated with disdain. Her consent to adoption was often 
obtained under conditions of duress. In a trilogy of cases in the 
1950s, the Supreme Court of Canada established that mothers 
can revoke their consent to adoption, with some qualifications. 
In 1970, the fact that she was sometimes subjected to 
significant coercion was acknowledged. Although these cases 
did not involve the rights of fathers, they are important because 
they reveal that adoption is part of a continuum of reproductive 
choices over which women need to have sole control. 
Moreover, they illustrate that the decision to relinquish a child 
for adoption is fraught and painful. In recent years, mothers’ 
rights, on the erroneous assertion that single mothers no longer 
face stigma or social disadvantage, have been restricted. In 
contrast, an unwed father, who initially had no rights under 
adoption legislation, can attempt to coerce the mother into 
abortion, ignore, malign, and harass her, and still assert rights 
over the baby at the time of birth.  
 
Part II of the article explores the origins of unwed 
fathers’ claims in adoption cases. Traditionally, only married 
men had legal custody of children and unmarried men had no 
say in relinquishment for adoption. In the 1970s, in a context in 
which cohabitation was being recognized as having important 
parallels with marriage, unmarried fathers with existing 
relationships with older children were determined to have a 
veto right over third party adoption. Unwed fathers’ claims 
were based on social fatherhood, particularly evidence that 
fathers had cohabited with, and supported, their children, not 




groups. Nonetheless, based on such precedents, more recent 
Charter analysis has opened the door for uninvolved and 
abusive men to claim an ‘interest’ in their genetic children.  
 
In Part III of this paper, I critique the insertion of 
formal equality reasoning into a context that is fundamentally 
gendered. With regard to newborn adoption, Charter reasoning 
has delivered equality with a vengeance. Although the 
examples in the article are based upon the non-marital context, 
I argue that all women, whatever their marital status, should 
have the sole right to determine the future of their newborn 
children. After all, married men can also be abusive, 
manipulative, and simply disinterested. The decision to release 
a child for adoption is analogous to, and interdependent with, 
the right to abortion, and relinquishment should be considered 
an issue of reproductive freedom, not a question of custody. 
Interference in the birth mother’s decision making process 
violates her section 15 right to equality; the on-going poverty 
and discrimination faced by single mothers are erased when the 
genetic claims of men are considered to give them equal 
standing with mothers in adoption cases. Moreover, women’s 
section 7 rights to liberty and security of the person are vitiated 
when men can interfere with adoption placement, forcing 
women to abort or to retain custody themselves.  
 
PART I: THE (LIMITED) RIGHTS OF THE BIRTH 
MOTHER 
 
Before the passage of adoption statutes, the unwed mother had 
de facto responsibility for her child. But this autonomy was 
based on denigration of the mother, not respect for her. She and 
her child were outcasts. Under the common law the child born 
to an unmarried mother was nullius filius, a child of nobody. 
As Blackstone asserted, “the incapacity of a bastard consists 
principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can 
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he have heirs, but of his own body.”13 It was assumed that 
women would lie about paternity, and that the father was “too 
uncertain a figure for the law to take any cognizance of him.”14 
The unwed father, therefore, had no legal connection, or 
obligation, to his child(ren): “fatherhood was … awarded to the 
man assumed to share a biological connection with the child. 
This man … was the mother’s husband.”15 Unmarried mothers 
faced myriad difficulties in raising children alone, and it is not 
surprising that ‘illegitimate’ infants comprised the 
overwhelming majority of those relinquished for adoption. 
Also unsurprisingly, once adoption statutes were passed, a 
married woman could not relinquish a baby without the consent 
of her husband.   
 
Canadian jurisdictions passed adoption statutes 
between 1913 and 1952.16 These statutes reflected both an on-
                                                
13  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London: 
Kerr, 1857) at 485. 
14  Re M (an infant), [1955] 2 QBD 479 at 488. 
15  Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in 
Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009) 21(2) CJWL 315 at 316.  
16  Alberta, An Act Respecting Infants, (1913), c 13, ss 1-9; British 
Columbia, An Act Respecting the Adoption of Children (1935), c 2, ss 
1-16; Manitoba, Child Welfare Act, c 35, ss 92-99; New Brunswick, 
Adoption Act, (1946), c 57; Newfoundland, Welfare of Children Act 
(1952) c 60; Northwest Territories, An Ordinance Respecting the 
Adoption of Children, (1967), c 2, ss 1-17; Ontario, Adoption Act 
(1921) c 55; Prince Edward Island, Adoption Act (1950) c 2; Quebec, 
Loi de l’Adoption, (1925), c 196, s 1; Saskatchewan, Child Welfare 
Act, c 278, part 4, ss 76-91. Despite the fact that adoption was not 
recognized under common law, informal adoption has a long, pre-
statutory reform, history: GF Lemby, Family Law (Toronto: 
International Self-Counsel Press, 1971) at 157. The status of 
informally adopted children, however, was tenuous. For example, in 
1909, foster parents in Ontario who had cared for a child for over a 




going denigration of the unwed mother, and the new emphasis 
on the child as innocent, a blank slate, dependent and 
vulnerable.17 It became morally imperative for the unwed 
mother to give up her baby. The founder of the Ontario 
Children’s Aid Society, J.J. Kelso, argued that “no unmarried 
mother can successfully bring up her child and save it from 
disgrace and obloquy. (But) the child, if adopted young by 
respectable, childless people, will grow up creditably, and 
without any painful reminders of its origins.”18 To remove any 
connection with the tainted mother, an adoption order divested 
“the natural parent, guardian or person in whose custody the 
child has been of all legal rights in respect of such child.”19 The 
child became “for the purposes of custody of the person and 
                                                                                           
child when the parents sought to reclaim her. Although the parents 
had signed an agreement with the fostering couple to release the child 
for adoption, the court referred to precedent and legal texts and 
asserted that “the law of England knows nothing of adoption” and 
that “parents cannot enter into an agreement legally binding to 
deprive themselves of the custody and control of their children; and, 
if they elect to do so, can at any moment resume their control over 
them:” Re Davis, [1909] OLR 384 at 386. The married father could 
always reclaim his child; no case establishing this right for the unwed 
mother, however, is extant in the Canadian context. Customary 
adoption, practiced by Indigenous peoples, was and remains, also, a 
form of informal adoption, and one which has had only tenuous legal 
recognition. For further information, see Cindy Baldassi, “The Legal 
Status of Customary Adoption Across Canada: Comparisons, 
Contrasts and Convergences” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 63. 
17  See: Chambers, supra note 10; and Patricia Holland, Picturing 
Childhood: The Myth of the Child in Popular Imagery (London: IB 
Taurus, 2004). 
18  As quoted in Andrew Jones and Leonard Rutman, In the Children’s 
Aid: J.J. Kelso and Child Welfare in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1981) at 156.  
19  This paragraph summarizes the provisions of the Ontario Adoption 
Act, RSO 1921, c 55, s 10(1)(a)-(c), 11(2). 
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rights of obedience, to all intents and purposes the child of the 
adopting parents.”20 The adoption process was shrouded in 
secrecy; the natural parent was symbolically erased from the 
child’s life and all original birth records were sealed. Adoption 
statutes introduced into law the “statutory death of the 
biological parents and the rebirth of the adoptee.”21 The 
biological father remained a shadowy figure, without rights, 
and with limited financial obligations, and these only in (rare) 
cases in which women kept their babies and could prove 
paternity in court. 
 
Consent for adoption could, and still can, be granted by 
the judge, against the will of the parents, if the parents were 
deemed unfit, if the parents were imprisoned, or if the child had 
been made a crown ward.22 Under some provincial regimes, 
unwed mothers could be determined to be unfit based simply 
on poverty,23 a condition that was all too common in a world in 
                                                
20  Adoption Act, RSO 1921, c 55, s 11(1)-(2). Until 1970, however, with 
regard to wider kin the child had no legal status. With the passage of 
the Child Welfare Act, 1970, this was amended, and adopted children 
were made equal with natural born children unless a contrary 
intention was expressed in the will of wider kin. This was confirmed 
in Re Barthelmes, [1971] 1 OR 752.  
21  Katrysha Bracco, “Patriarchy and the Law of Adoption: Beneath the 
Best Interests of the Child” (1997) 35(4) Alta L Rev 1035 at 1041.  
22  Ontario Adoption Act, RSO 1921, c 55, s 5. 
23  In Ontario, companion legislation to adoption statutes explicitly 
constructed the unwed mother as unfit. The Children of Unmarried 
Parents Act undermined the common law assumption that the mother 
was the de facto guardian of her illegitimate child. Instead, it 
provided in section 10 that “the provincial officer [the government 
employee appointed to enforce these three acts] may upon his own 
application be appointed guardian of a child born out of wedlock 
either alone or jointly with the mother of such child.” Under child 
welfare legislation, the CAS had the right to remove children from 




which single mothers were deeply stigmatized and employment 
opportunities for all women were limited. Unwed mothers were 
put under considerable pressure to release newborns for third 
party adoption. Svanhuit Josie, a child welfare worker from 
Ottawa, lamented in 1955 that “it seems to me that casework 
with the unmarried mother has come to mean the process of 
convincing her that it is impossible if not absolutely immoral 
for her to plan to keep her own child. She must be made to face 
the ‘reality’ of the situation, which means to give it up for 
adoption.”24 Her critique, however, prompted a harsh rebuttal 
from the supervisor of the Unmarried Parents Department of 
the Toronto Children’s Aid Society, who asserted that most 
mothers keeping their children “were emotionally sick people” 
and that the social worker therefore “trie(d) to be of assistance 
in helping her assess the realities of her situation.”25  
 
Adoption statutes made placement with a third party 
legal. A central purpose of adoption statutes was to provide 
security to adoptive families; a fundamental disrespect for the 
‘illegitimate’ mother underlay this legislation. The consent of 
the mother was required, but the conditions under which she 
gave such consent were not regulated. She faced considerable 
social stigma, possible familial pressure, and the prospect of 
                                                                                           
crown wards and then to release them for adoption without parental 
consent to relinquishment. This power was expanded under the 
Children of Unmarried Parents Act. Section 11 established that when 
“the mother…through lack of means is unable, or through misconduct 
is unfit to have the care of the child, the child may, with the consent 
of the provincial officer, be dealt with as a ‘neglected child’.” Simply 
put, an unwed mother could be deemed unfit purely because of her 
poverty: An Act for the Protection of the Children of Unmarried 
Parents, SO 1921, c 54, ss 10-11.  
24  Svanhuit Josie, “The American Caricature of the Unmarried Mother” 
(1955) 29(12) Canadian Welfare 247 at 249.   
25  Kathleen Sutherton, “Another View” (1955) 31(5) Canadian Welfare 
7. 
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poverty. Ostensibly, the child to be adopted was placed in a 
probationary home pending formal adoption and the mother 
had a right to revoke her consent until adoption was finalized. 
In practice, however, it was assumed to be in the best interest 
of the child to remain in the adoptive home.26 As one judge 
asserted in Ontario in 1948, despite the fact that an adoption 
had not been finalized, the child could not be returned to the 
mother:  
 
[W]here a parent has signed a solemn consent to 
adoption under the provisions of the Adoption 
Act and the foster parents have taken the child 
and assumed their duties with a view to fulfilling 
the probationary requirements of the act, I do not 
think that a child is to be restored to the natural 
parent on the mere assertion of that parent’s 
right. I think the parent must go further and 
show that ‘having regard to the welfare of the 
child’ it should not be permitted to remain with 
the foster parents.27  
 
In the 1950s, a trilogy of Supreme Court cases 
established that, until an adoption was finalized, mothers had a 
right to revoke consent and have infants returned to them. In 
Martin v. Duffell (1950),28 the mother stated her objections to 
the adoption promptly, but the adoptive parents and the 
adoption agency refused to return the child. It was found that 
before the final order of adoption the mother had the right to 
reclaim her child unless her behavior had rendered her 
inappropriate as a parent.29 In Hepton v. Maat (1957),30 the 
                                                
26  For an extended discussion of this issue, see: Chambers, supra note 
10 at chapter 4. 
27  Re Fex, [1948] OWN 497 at 499. 
28  [1950] SCR 737 [Martin].  




mother and father had initially given up their child because the 
husband was unemployed, they were very young, and they 
were recent immigrants from Holland with considerable 
financial challenges. They quickly regretted the decision and 
tried to revoke their consent before the adoption was finalized, 
but the adoptive parents contested. The court found that 
“natural parents are entitled to custody unless by reason of 
some act, condition or circumstance affecting them it is evident 
that the welfare of the child requires that the fundamental 
natural relationship be severed.”31 In the final case of the 
trilogy, Agar v. McNeilly (1958),32 heard in 1958, it was found 
that “the mother of an illegitimate child, who is of good 
character and is able and willing to support it in satisfactory 
surroundings, is entitled to the custody of that child.” The court 
also noted that the mother had been quick to revoke her consent 
and that the adoptive parents, and the adoption agency, had 
gone to great lengths to conceal the location of the child and to 
encourage the mother to give up her quest for the baby.33 
 
In Re Mugford (1970),34 the court explicitly 
acknowledged the problems that women faced, such as those 
hinted at in Agar. The mother sought an order for “production 
and delivery of the infant David John Mugford” born to her 
out-of-wedlock.35 The child had been placed for adoption, but 
the final adoption order had not yet been granted. On learning 
that she was pregnant, the mother had moved to live with a 
married sister in Ottawa. She consulted the Children’s Aid 
                                                                                           
30  [1957] SCR 606.  
31  Ibid at 607.  
32  [1958] SCR 52 at para 10 [Agar]. The court is referring to its decision 
in Martin. 
33  Ibid at para 10, referring to Martin.  
34  [1970] 1 OR 601 [Re Mugford]. 
35  Ibid at para 1.  
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Society with regard to the future of her child and two social 
workers affirmed that the mother had been “tense and upset,” 
“depressed … without much self-defense or self-assurance,” 
and “in a state of indecision as to what should be done about 
the child since she would have no way of keeping it.”36 She 
was 19 years-old and her parents did not know that she was 
pregnant. She signed the adoption papers, but shortly thereafter 
was so distressed by her actions that she informed her parents 
of her predicament and sought their help in regaining custody 
of her child. The child had been placed in an adoptive home for 
only a few weeks, but the Children’s Aid Society informed the 
mother that: 
 
David has adjusted well to his new environment 
and we cannot disturb this arrangement. 
However, you can feel assured that he is 
receiving plenty of loving care, and he will be 
given every opportunity to grow into a healthy 
and happy adult … I hope you will be able to 
adjust and make a new life for yourself.37  
 
The court of first instance determined that there was 
“no evidence on the record which suggests that the respondent 
mother had deserted or abandoned [the] child.”38 Instead, it 
held that “she was motivated solely by a sincere desire to do 
what she thought was then in the best interests of her child 
despite an almost overpowering desire on her part to keep him 
and be a mother to him.”39 This case illustrates the social 
pressures that might encourage a woman to relinquish her child 
for adoption and the difficulty with which these decisions are 
                                                
36  Ibid at para 6.  
37  Ibid at para 8. 
38  Ibid at para 11.  




made. The fact that the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
decision represents the high water mark of the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the rights of mothers.40  
 
Despite these edicts from the Supreme Court, however, 
evidence from lower court decisions suggests that pressures 
within the CAS regarding adoption continued. Young women 
asserted that “counseling … was directed only towards 
adoption and did not adequately point out the alternatives”41 
and consisted of “a rough estimate of the welfare payments she 
would receive if she kept the baby, and having decided that this 
sum would provide no real life or future for her child, adoption 
was ‘sold’ to her as the only alternative.”42 Social workers 
continued to tell women that they could not revoke consent, 
and refused to return babies even when such children “had only 
been placed in another home for a fortnight or so and when no 
application for adoption had been instituted.”43  
 
In response to the trilogy, Re Mugford, and the 
resistance of social workers, provinces revised their adoption 
                                                
40  Re Mugford, [1970] SCR 261. 
41  Infant Registration No 74-09-001156 (Re), [1974] BCJ No 438 at 
para 6. In this instance, however, the court rejected her evidence on 
the basis that she was “too intelligent” not to have understood what 
she was doing. 
42  JSB (Re), [1972] BCJ No 275 at para 5. In this case, the judge 
acknowledged such pressures and the baby was returned to the 
mother and, perhaps not unimportantly, her new fiancé, who had 
expressed his commitment to the child. They were exhorted to 
“legitimize this relationship without delay, even if this denies them 
the ‘nice’ wedding both hope to have:” at para 18. 
43  LMC v RJT, [1972] NBJ No 47 at para 15. Although the court 
acknowledged that the delays had been through no fault of the mother 
in this case, custody was nonetheless awarded to the adoptive parents, 
though they had not even known of the child’s existence at the time at 
which the mother initially revoked her consent. 
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statutes, introducing provisions that made it clear that 
revocation was possible only within a short period of time 
immediately after birth; after such time, if the mother changed 
her mind, proceedings in court would be required. For 
example, Ontario established a 21-day window for withdrawal 
of consent.44 An Ontario county court, interpreting the new 
provision, asserted that its purpose was to prevent “capricious 
and arbitrary evasion of a consent … the inquiry by the Court 
is not to be hampered by the regrets and changing whims of the 
natural parents.”45 The effect of these provisions was that after 
the short revocation period the mother “and the proposed 
adoptive parents [were] on an equal basis … That being so the 
paramount consideration is the welfare of the child.”46 In the 
1980s, the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to 
interpret these revisions with regard to revocation; the 
assumption underlying their decisions in these cases seems to 
be that women who relinquish their babies are simply bad 
                                                
44  Ontario Adoption Act, RSO 1958, s 73(7).  For similar legislation in 
other provinces, see: Alberta, Child Welfare Act, RSA 2000, c 12, s 
61(1) (which allows for a 10-day window for revocation of consent); 
British Columbia, Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 19 (which allows 
for a 30 day window); Manitoba, Child Welfare Act, RSM 1970, c 80, 
s 86(5) (which allows for revocation within a year, unless the child 
has been placed in an adoptive home); Newfoundland, Adoption Act, 
RSNL 1990, c A-3, s 12(1) (which allows for a 21-day window for 
revocation); Nova Scotia, Children’s Services Act, RSNS 1989, c 68, 
s 11(1)  (which allows for revocation until the child is placed in a 
home); Saskatchewan, Family Services Act, RSS 1978, c 52, s 4(A) 
(which allows for a 30-day window for revocation); Yukon, 
Children’s Act Part 3, RSY 2002, c 31, s 86(1) (which allows for a 
30-day window). 
45  Kilmer et al and Resney et al, [1973] 2 OR 482 at para 29. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by courts in British Columbia and 
Newfoundland based on their revised legislation: Re BJE, [1961] BCJ 
No 116; and Re Jenkins, [1973] NJ No 22 [Jenkins]. 




mothers, not women who face difficult circumstances and who 
relinquish their children as an act of love.  
 
In a new trilogy of cases, the rights of relinquishing 
mothers were severely circumscribed. In the first case, 
Manitoba (Director of Child Welfare) v. Y (1981),47 a 19-year-
old Manitoba mother had released her child for adoption 
immediately after the seven-day waiting period, required under 
legislation, had elapsed. Two days later, she attempted to 
revoke her consent, but was told that the baby had been placed 
for adoption. Under provincial legislation, the mother could 
revoke her consent within the child’s first year of life or until 
the baby was placed in a probationary adoptive home, 
whichever came first.48 The court of first instance, therefore, 
found no strict violation of her rights. On appeal, Monnin J.A. 
found that “in effect, what the Director did by his speedy action 
was to deprive this young mother of all her rights…The 
legislature, having made provision for the withdrawal of a 
voluntary surrender, expected this right to be of some effect, 
and capable of being made use of.”49 The Supreme Court, 
however, disagreed and reversed the decision. The legislation 
did not restrict the right to place the child immediately after the 
signing of consent, and no rights had been violated. The 
woman, especially since she had already relinquished an earlier 
child for adoption, understood the impact of the consent form.50 
The second revocation case was heard in 1983. Although the 
mother in Racine v. Woods (1983)51 was not found to have 
abandoned her child, her claim was denied. This case was 
complicated by the fact that a particularly long period of time 
                                                
47  Manitoba (Director of Child Welfare) v Y, [1981] 3 WWR 668.  
48  The Child Welfare Act, 1974 (Man), c C80, ss 15(1)-(2), 15(4), 15(6). 
49  Supra note 47 at para 13. 
50  Manitoba (Director of Child Welfare) v Y, [1981] 1 SCR 625. 
51  [1983] 2 SCR 173 [Racine]. 
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had passed during which the child had been in the undisrupted 
custody of the adoptive parents. The preference for the 
biological parent was held to be of less importance than the 
best interest of the child, which the court deemed would be 
served by leaving the child with the parents with whom the 
child had bonded: “this does not mean, of course, that the 
child’s tie with its natural parent is irrelevant in the making of 
an order under the section … But it is the parental tie as a 
meaningful and positive force in the life of the child and not in 
the life of the parent that the court has to be concerned 
about.”52 King v. Low (1985)53 confirmed these limitations on 
                                                
52  Ibid at 185. It should also be noted that this case was complicated by 
issues of race as the mother was Aboriginal and the adoptive family 
consisted of a white mother and a Métis father. Some argue that the 
Métis father could therefore provide the necessary cultural support. 
However, Aboriginal identity is not Métis identity, or experience. 
This case, in particular Wilson J.’s assertion that the “closer the bond 
that develops with the prospective adoptive parents the less important 
the racial element becomes” has been the subject of considerable 
critique: see ibid at 187-188. While the concerns about respect for 
Aboriginality might have greater weight given statutory reform since 
1983, Racine has yet to be overturned by the Supreme Court. See, 
Tae Mee Park, “In the Best Interests of the Aboriginal Child” (2003) 
16 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 43 at 43; Patricia Monture, “A 
Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations” (1989) 3 CJWL 
1; and Gillian Calder, “‘Finally, I Know Where I Am Going to be 
From’: Culture, Context and Time in a Look Back at Racine v. 
Woods” in Kim Brooks, ed, Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s 
Difference (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010) 
173. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court rejected the 
possibility, raised by the courts in Manitoba, of an open adoption in 
which the mother might apply for access. The court, in adoption 
cases, seems to see openness as a threat to the stability of the adoptive 
family. However, in divorce access cases, it is not seen as disruptive, 
but as necessary for the well-being of the child. For further 
information on divorce, access and the requirement that the mother 
facilitate visits by the father, see: Susan Boyd, “Backlash and the 
Construction of Legal Knowledge: The Case of Child Custody Law” 




the rights of the natural mother. The mother had chosen private 
adoption in the hope that she might have some contact with the 
child as he grew up and released her child only because of fear 
of the disapproval of her family. The child left the hospital with 
the adoptive parents five days after his birth and resided with 
them thereafter without disruption. The mother immediately 
regretted her decision, discussed the situation with her mother 
and requested the return of her child, but the adoptive parents 
refused. The trial judge held that the mother had neither 
abandoned her child nor conducted herself in a manner that 
meant the court should refuse to enforce her rights as a 
guardian, but nonetheless concluded that the child should 
remain with the adoptive parents.54 The Supreme Court 
concurred and dismissed the mother’s appeal.55 
 
In a recent case, an Ontario divisional court asserted 
that “the existence of a valid consent by a parent to an adoption 
is … fundamental to the integrity of the entire adoption process 
… Thus if it can be proven that a consent to adoption is 
obtained through undue influence or coercion, it can be argued 
that the adoption proceedings based on that consent must be 
nullified.”56 A 17-year-old mother claimed that she had been 
subjected to undue influence and that she had verbally 
contacted the Children’s Aid Society during the requisite 
period to revoke her consent. Legislation, however, requires 
                                                                                           
Revisions to the Divorce Act Through a Family Violence Research 
Filter: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly” (2003) 20 Can J Fam L 11; 
Wanda Wiegers & Michaela Keet, “Collaborative Family Law and 
Gender Inequalities: Balancing Risks and Opportunities” (2008) 46 
Osgoode Hall LJ 733; and Alison Harvison Young, “Joint Custody 
As Norm: Solomon Revisited” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 785.   
53  [1985] 1 SCR 87.  
54  Ibid at para 9.  
55  Ibid at para 34. 
56  ND-F v Jh D, 2007 ONCJ 49 at para 33.  
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that this revocation be made in writing, which she failed to do, 
and the Children’s Aid Society, in the absence of written 
revocation, did not respect her wishes. The court, however, 
rejected her coercion claim and explicitly distinguished a 
situation in which a “parent has changed her mind or regrets a 
decision made under the influence of family members or 
cultural pressures.”57  
 
Clearly, this reflects an impoverished understanding of 
the challenges which unwed mothers, particularly young 
unwed mothers, still confront. Mothers face potential poverty 
and stigma, pressure from families, and may also face pressure 
from the bureaucracies that are ostensibly charged with helping 
women. While the security of the placement of the child is a 
legitimate concern, mothers have a legal right to reclaim 
children early in the adoption process and this right should be 
respected within the legislatively established time frame. These 
cases do not directly engage the question of whether or not the 
mother should have sole decision-making power with regard to 
relinquishment for adoption and concern the right to change 
one’s mind about adoption, not the right to relinquish without 
interference. Nonetheless, they are important. Courts often 
“subordinate the importance of blood ties to the stability of the 
existing home setting”58 when they assert that children should 
stay in adoptive homes, despite the wishes of mothers. It is 
ironic that precisely when the pressures to which women are 
subjected were being denied recognition, the rights of unwed 
fathers were being expanded and their ‘blood ties’ to children 





                                                
57  Ibid at para 22.  




PART II: THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS 
 
Historically, unwed fathers had no rights or obligations to their 
children. In 1973, however, a father, who had cohabited with 
his child, asserted that he should be able to veto the unilateral 
decision of the mother to release the child for adoption. His 
position was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
father in Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. 
Lyttle (1973)59 had lived with the mother of the child until the 
child was two years old, at which time the mother left to live 
with another man, taking the child with her.60 Without 
informing the father, she placed the child with the Children’s 
Aid Society for adoption. The father did not learn of the 
situation until the time period for contesting the wardship order 
had elapsed, but before the adoption order was finalized. He 
argued that the wardship order was void on procedural grounds 
as he had not been informed; without a wardship order, the 
adoption could not proceed. The court upheld his claim.61  
 
In R. v. Gingell (1976),62 the Supreme Court held that 
“prima facie, the word ‘parent’ when used in a statute should 
be given its ordinary meaning unless, in the context of the 
statute, a restricted meaning should be given” reversing the 
general presumption that illegitimate children could be 
excluded categorically under principles of statutory 
interpretation. In this case the father had lived with his 
                                                
59  [1973] SCR 568 [Lyttle].  
60  Technically the mother was within her rights under legislation. In 
1929, consent provisions within adoption had been amended such that 
the consent of a father was required if the child resided with, and was 
maintained by, the father at the time of the application: The Statute 
Law Amendment Act, SO (1929), c 23, s 11. However, Lyttle did not 
live with or support his child at the time of the surrender to the CAS. 
61  Supra note 59. 
62  [1976] 2 SCR 86.  
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children, but the mother left him, taking the children with her. 
She thereafter abandoned them to the Children’s Aid Society 
and they became crown wards without his knowledge or 
consent. The children were returned to his custody.63  
 
While historically the unwed father was constructed as 
“too uncertain a figure for the law to take any cognizance of 
him,”64 by the 1970s courts recognized the parental efforts of 
cohabiting non-marital fathers. When men have established and 
positive relationships with their children, such an interpretation 
of marriage as irrelevant is entirely reasonable. But it is 
important to note that decisions were premised, not on the 
genetic connection itself, but on evidence that fathers had acted 
as social parents to their children. As McClung J. held in a case 
involving former cohabitation, “the narrow issue in this appeal 
and that upon which the rights of H.J.L. must be resolved is the 
omission of notice to him, an interested father. Full disclosure 
of his real presence was not made to the learned chambers 
judge.” He made it clear, however, that he “[did] not wish to be 
taken as deciding that notice to biological fathers must be given 
in all proposed adoptions.”65 
 
In 1975, an Ontario divisional court directly considered 
the question of whether or not a mother was obligated to name 
the father of her child when she relinquished a newborn baby 
for adoption. The court explicitly distinguished newborn 
adoption from circumstances such as those in Lyttle. The court 
asserted that newborn adoption “discloses an entirely different 
statement of facts. In the Lyttle case, the father not only wanted 
custody of his son, but also in the registration of the birth, 
acknowledged his paternity. The proceedings taken by the 
Children’s Aid Society were taken behind his back, although 
                                                
63  Ibid.  
64  Re M (an infant), 1955 2 QBD 479 at 488. 




the registration, if examined, would have disclosed his 
relationship and name.” The mother of a newborn, in contrast, 
would not be forced to disclose the name of the father of her 
child.66 
 
In 1979, four Ontario wardship orders were challenged 
to determine the obligations of the Children’s Aid Society in 
investigating paternity and naming fathers in adoption cases. 
The family court in York County held that a father of children 
born out of wedlock is entitled to notice and consent in 
adoption proceedings. The court had to consider the fact that 
distinctions between married and unmarried parents had been 
abolished. Rights of notice for the father were vigorously 
opposed by counsel for the Children’s Aid Society who argued 
that giving unfettered rights to all genetic fathers would lead to 
violent men and sperm donors being able to interfere in 
adoption proceedings and would thwart the purpose of 
legislation by reducing rates of relinquishment. However, the 
court found that these concerns could be met as the Children’s 
Aid Society had the right to exclude specific fathers after 
investigating the circumstances surrounding each birth and 
potential adoption.67 All four applications were sent back for 
consent from fathers.68 
 
Charter-based equality rights were first raised in the 
context of the adoption of non-marital children in 1986. In this 
case, a father petitioned for an order restraining the placement 
of his daughter for adoption. He had never been married to the 
child’s mother, but had lived with her before and after the birth 
                                                
66  Re Ward, [1975] OJ No 2357. 
67  Re MLA and three other applicants (1979), 25 OR (2d) 779. 
68  In one case the mother had clearly stated that she did not want to 
name the father; in the second case the couple seemed to agree about 
adoption and the consent would be unproblematic; the third and 
fourth cases were not specified. 
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of the child. He argued that the requirement that only the 
mother consent to adoption in cases not involving marriage 
discriminated against him on the basis of sex and marital status 
and thereby violated the equality provisions of the Charter. 
The petition was granted. The court found that adoption 
provisions create statutory distinctions between fathers and 
mothers that contradict changing social conditions and the 
elimination of illegitimacy at law.69 While in this case the 
outcome was a reasonable reflection of the father’s 
involvement in the child’s life, by endorsing the father’s 
Charter arguments that he was discriminated against on the 
basis of his status as an unwed father, instead of focusing on 
indices of social fatherhood, the case opened the door for 
purely genetic claims by uninvolved non-marital fathers.70 
 
In extensive proceedings in 1987 and 1988, an Ontario 
family court (York) and then a divisional court again 
considered the claim that biological fathers were discriminated 
against by not being notified with regard to the adoption of 
infants born out of wedlock. The case originated with a 
procedure for finalization of adoption. The baby was born of a 
casual relationship where the mother had not notified the 
father, but Nevins J. returned the adoption, “adjourned the 
proceedings, directed that the Attorneys-General of Ontario 
and Canada be advised that he had raised a constitutional issue 
as to the validity of s. 131(1) of the Act … [and] arranged for 
the appointment of counsel to represent the class of biological 
fathers who might be affected by the constitutional issue.”71 
                                                
69  MacVicar v Superintendent of Family and Child Services et al (1986), 
6 LW 635-026. 
70  For an analysis of early Charter decisions, see Judy Fudge, “The 
Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to 
Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles” (1987) 25(3) 
Osgoode Hall LJ 485.  
71  CES v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1988] OJ No 




Counsel representing the interests of genetic fathers argued that 
“the mother and the father (married or not) are necessary to 
conceive the child” and that “the fact of whether or not the 
parents are married has no effect on the child; and both are 
presumed to be able and entitled to care for the child.”72 
Counsel for the Attorney-General asserted that “the purpose of 
the legislation in this regard is to achieve an expeditious 
adoption”73 and that “by the fact of birth the mother has at least 
some minimal involvement with the care of the child, while the 
fathers, married or not, have no similar involvement.”74 They 
also submitted that “parental rights of a biological father do not 
exist ‘in a vacuum’ equal to those of the mother, but rather are 
rights which arise, or are ‘activated’ by some positive conduct 
being taken by the father.”75 It was asserted that, because the 
Children’s Aid Society was obligated to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding pregnancy and obtain consent from 
involved fathers, the only father who would be excluded “is a 
male person who by an act of casual sexual intercourse 
impregnates a woman and shows no sense of responsibility for 
the natural consequences of the act of sexual intercourse.”76 
The divisional court acknowledged that mother and father, in 
such cases, are not “similarly situated. The mother because of 
physical necessity has shown responsibility to the child … It is 
thus apparent that the different statutory treatment of the two 
persons is based on their respective demonstrated responsibility 
to the child, not upon their different sexes.”77 The adoption was 
allowed to proceed.   
                                                
72  S(CE) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1987), 63 
OR (2d) 114 at para 22. 
73  Ibid at para 23. 
74  Ibid at para 23. 
75  Ibid at para 24. 
76  Supra note 71 at para 12. 
77  Ibid at para 15.  
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In a 1992 Nova Scotia case,78 counsel for an unwed 
and uninvolved father asserted that “the provision of the Act 
which permits an adoption of a child to take place without the 
consent of the father who does not come within the definition 
of ‘parent’ contained in the Act, amounts to a violation of the 
equality rights,” and thus should be struck down as 
unconstitutional.79 The applicant’s counsel argued that the 
applicant was discriminated against in that his consent was not 
required because he was male and unmarried. The Children’s 
Aid Society contended that “males do not form a discrete or 
insular minority that has been stereotyped or subject to 
historical disadvantage or vulnerability. Furthermore, the fact 
that the law treats men differently than women based on 
‘biological reality’ does not constitute discrimination. Thus, the 
applicant has not suffered discrimination based on sex.”80 The 
court, however, disagreed and concluded that “the Legislature 
did not deliberately set out to deprive a child born out of 
wedlock of the possible benefit of the fostering and 
maintaining of a relationship with his or her father” and that 
parens patriae jurisdiction could be exercised to hear the 
father’s claim for custody.81 
 
In contrast, in 1994, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court held that the mother was the sole guardian of the baby 
immediately after birth and that she, therefore, had the legal 
                                                
78  DT (Re), [1992] NSJ No 387.  
79  Ibid at para 13.  
80  Ibid at para 16.  
81  Ibid at para 46. This support for the unmarried mother might seem 
ironic, given the coercive tactics used by the Children’s Aid Society 
to convince women to release children for adoption. However, the 
consent of men, of course, makes the availability of the baby for 





right to place her child for adoption without the consent of the 
baby’s father.82 This case provides graphic evidence of why 
some women fear revealing their pregnancies to men with 
whom they have been involved. The mother explicitly 
supported the claim of the adoptive parents and asserted that 
she would take custody herself rather than see the father 
succeed in his claim.83 The genetic father had a history of 
abusive behavior: “Mr. Z. spat in her face, pulled her hair, and 
called her a slut.”84 She sought refuge in a women’s shelter and 
charged him with assault. He was released on a promise not to 
see her, but breached this agreement and was arrested several 
times.85 They reconciled, but “he became abusive and 
threatening” when he learned of her pregnancy: “he swore at 
her; left numerous harassing telephone messages on her 
answering machine; came by her apartment and banged on her 
door and shouted and drove by her building honking his 
horn.”86 When he threatened her with a knife at her abdomen, 
she “decided to leave Winnipeg, have her baby and place it for 
adoption.”87 She travelled to British Columbia, found an 
adoption agency and asked that information be withheld from 
the father because she considered him to be “a danger to her 
and her child.”88 She made a false formal declaration that the 
father of the child was unknown “because she thought it would 
help to keep [the baby] safe.”89 The adoptive parents were 
deemed ‘stable’, although not wealthy, and the adoptive father 
                                                
82  JNZ v JD, [1994] BCJ No 969.  
83  Ibid at para 2.  
84  Ibid at para 9. 
85  Ibid at paras 12-15. 
86  Ibid at para 20. 
87  Ibid at para 24. 
88  Ibid at para 25.  
89  Ibid at para 31. 
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010] 368 
had been an adopted child and wanted an open adoption. The 
couple had been hand selected by the birth mother.90 Her 
choices clearly reflected her concern and love for the child. Mr. 
Z “advance[d] his claim to custody on the grounds of the blood 
relationship between himself and the baby.”91 The mother 
asserted that his “abusive and violent nature makes him an 
unfit parent, and that the attitudes he has displayed towards her 
and toward women in general are of particular concern given 
that this child is a girl.”92 The custody of the adoptive parents 
was upheld.93 It was also noted that “since baby I. will know 
who her father is, she can choose, at the appropriate time, 
whether to initiate contact with him.”94  
 
In contrast, in a 1998 case, the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s Bench, family division, expressed distress that the 
birth mother “would not disclose the birth father's name 
because ‘she felt he may not have co-operated in adoption 
planning’.”95 This leaves open the question of whether his 
anticipated lack of co-operation resulted from an expectation 
that he would want to raise the child himself.” 96 They did not 
inquire as to why the mother might not want her child to be 
raised by the father. Concern was expressed that, even with the 
anticipated creation of a birth father registry, “if the fact of the 
birth of a child has been hidden from the birth father, then he is 
not in a position to take advantage of the registry, so his new 
                                                
90  Ibid at paras 29, 35.  
91  Ibid at para 64. 
92  Ibid at para 68.  
93  Ibid at para 97.   
94  Ibid at para 97.  
95  RA (Re), [1998] MJ No 348.  




rights are completely illusory,”97 and the court asserted their 
right to exercise parens patrie jurisdiction to fill a legislative 
gap.98 The court mistakenly assumed that fathers and mothers 
are equally involved in child-rearing: “parents are much more 
equal partners in relation to their children than in the past.”99 
The court castigated the mother for denying the father “the 
right to know that he has a child … If this adoption is granted, 
the legal relationship between father and son will be forever 
terminated without any notice … That this father and this son 
are being treated this way is positively draconian. That the 
mother would act this way is unfortunate. That two agencies of 
the government would assist her in so doing is completely 
unacceptable.”100 Despite the child having been placed for two 
years with an adoptive family, the court ordered the agency to 
search for the father.  
 
In a 2000 decision of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, a lower court decision to award custody to a genetic 
father was overturned. The mother had told the father of the 
pregnancy, and he had wanted to marry her, or live together, 
and raise the child together. She did not have faith in the 
relationship, and ceased contact with the father and released the 
child for adoption without giving the father’s name to the 
adoption agency. When he learned of the adoption placement 
(four months after the birth), the father placed his name on the 
provincial birth fathers’ registry and commenced proceedings 
for custody.101 By doing so within the 150 day limit imposed 
by legislation, the father put himself within the definition of a 
‘father’ whose consent was required for the adoption. The 
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mother regretted her decision and “although she had consented 
to the adoption and had not taken any steps to revoke her 
consent, at trial she supported the father's position, and sought 
an order for joint custody and access.”102 At the court of first 
instance, the father was granted interim custody, the adoption 
was denied, and the mother was awarded reasonable access. 
The appeal of the adoptive parents, however, was dealt with 
immediately to avoid further disruption or uncertainty for the 
child and the original decision was overturned. Rowles J.A., in 
dissent, would have dismissed the appellants’ emphasis “on the 
birth father's not having taken active steps to pursue the 
question of his parenthood and his opposition to the adoption 
of the child between the time he first learned that the birth 
mother was pregnant and the date on which he became 
registered in the birth fathers' registry … [and their contention] 
that he did not have the best interests of the child in mind.”103 
Reviewing the history of legislation with regard to adoption, 
Rowles J.A. asserted that the provisions of the Adoption Act 
had to be interpreted in the context of the Charter, and based 
on an understanding that “the unequal treatment accorded 
natural fathers evolved from tradition and social custom rather 
than a demonstrated unwillingness or inability to parent.”104 
Prowse J.A., however, placed much more emphasis on the care 
to be provided to the child. The adoptive parents had bonded 
with the baby for 10 months, had an open adoptive agreement 
with the mother, and were stable and economically 
comfortable. The father proposed to have his mother, and a 
variety of other caregivers, provide care for the child. Prowse 
J.A. asserted that “based on the uncertainties associated with 
the care of the child in the birth father's home, I conclude that 
the trial judge erred in finding that the factors relating to the 
child's best interests were relatively equal as between the two 
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families. Apart from the biological factor, the balance was 
clearly in favour of the adoptive parents. That being so … the 
biological factor assumed overriding significance,” a 
significance with which she disagreed.105 The court set aside 
the order, dismissed the application of the birth father and 
made an order of adoption. As the disparate outcomes in these 
cases illustrate, there has been little consistency or 
predictability in Canadian law with regard to the rights of 
unwed fathers in newborn adoption cases, and much room for 
judicial discretion. This may, however, be about to change.  
 
An emphasis on the rights of biological fathers has 
been entrenched in Canadian law in Trociuk v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General) (“Trociuk”),106 the leading 
naming case in Canada, which further jeopardizes the rights of 
gestational mothers who seek to relinquish children for 
adoption. In Trociuk, the Court found that “differential 
treatment of [unwed] mothers and fathers [in birth registration 
and naming] … withholds a benefit from fathers in a manner 
which has the effect of signaling to them and to society as a 
whole that fathers are less capable or less worthy of recognition 
or value than mothers.”107 The decision relied on a formal 
equality analysis that de-contextualized the positions of an 
unwed (and largely uninvolved) father and a custodial mother 
and entrenched the patriarchal norm in Canadian naming 
law.108 The Trociuk court failed to recognize that distinctions 
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between mothers and fathers at the time of birth are based, not 
on stereotypes that mothers are superior nurturers, but on the 
realities of pregnancy. Rejecting stereotypes that portray 
women as innately nurturing, and corresponding beliefs that 
fathers are incapable of positive parenting, “does not require 
that we also reject any meaningful differences between 
biological motherhood and biological fatherhood.”109 The ratio 
in Trociuk, however, suggests that such differences are now to 
be denied in the name of ‘equality’; such de-contextualized 
analysis reduces women to the status of incubators and has 
disturbing consequences for mothers who wish to release their 
newborns for adoption.  
 
The impact of Trociuk was immediately apparent in 
adoption cases. In 2003, prospective adoptive parents brought a 
motion before the Ontario Court of Justice that only the mother 
is a parent who must consent to adoption.110 The circumstances 
of this case reveal the potential for a father to harass and abuse 
a woman he knows to be pregnant. The father was told of the 
pregnancy, but responded with anger, not support. He denied 
responsibility, bad-mouthed the mother, and shut her out of his 
life. His family ordered the mother to stay away from their 
house. She then decided to place the child for adoption. After 
the birth, and after giving a medical history for adoption, the 
father asserted that he and his parents wanted to raise the baby. 
The mother told him to seek his rights through the Children’s 
Aid Society, which he failed to do within the prescribed time 
frame.111 The mother had not cohabited with the father, did not 
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name him on the birth certificate, and he had not claimed 
paternity. She therefore asserted that he did not have standing 
as a parent to challenge her decision.112 Although the Adoption 
Act clearly delineates and limits the circumstances in which a 
biological father will be deemed to have rights with regard to 
adoption, requiring him to have some involvement in the 
pregnancy and/or child’s life,113 and despite the failure of this 
father to seek such rights, the definition of ‘father’ was held to 
be discriminatory.   
 
The court determined that it “must consider whether 
the decision in Trociuk v. Attorney General for British 
Columbia has any bearing on this court’s decision whether to 
declare the mother to be the only parent as defined in the 
legislation or whether this court should find that the biological 
father should be notified.”114 The court found that the father “is 
in fact the biological father of the child”115 and because Trociuk 
required a mechanism to allow the father to appear on the birth 
registration, it followed that “the failure to notify the biological 
father of this proceeding and the failure to give him an 
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opportunity to respond to a motion to dispense with his 
consent, on the basis that he is statutorily excluded as a 
biological parent, similarly violates his rights under subsection 
15(1) of the Charter.”116 The adoption agency was ordered to 
obtain the father’s consent. If they could not do so, a hearing 
would be held to determine whether his consent could be 
dispensed with. If his consent was found to be required, the 
wardship order would be set aside and he could claim 
custody.117  
 
This decision is clearly problematic. The father 
harassed and failed to support the mother. She chose adoption 
on the assumption that he could not interfere. Her consent, in a 
context in which such interference was subsequently allowed, 
was not free. She might well have chosen either abortion or 
custody herself had she been able to predict the outcome of 
these court proceedings. He had also failed to take any positive 
steps to assert his paternity by the means available to him at 
law, despite knowing about the birth of the baby and the 
impending adoption. While the uninvolved, harassing father 
could contest custody on the basis of his ‘equality’ rights, her 
consent was considered irrevocable. As commentators in the 
United States have noted, it is intensely unfair that a father can 
misbehave throughout the pregnancy, including denying 
paternity to friends and family, and that these facts “have no 
legal impact on his opportunity for fatherhood, symbolic or 
otherwise.”118 The mother is given no such second chances, 
despite her much greater investment in the child and her 
demonstrated concern for the child’s best interest. Her consent 
is final, even in the changed circumstances involving 
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interference by a man she considers a threat to the well-being 
of her child. 
 
In 2006, the ‘Saskatchewan Dad case’ “became a cause 
célèbre for the fathers’ rights movement in Canada.”119 The 
‘Dad’, identified as Adam Hendricks for the purpose of 
litigation, contested adoption on the sole basis of his genetic 
connection to his child. He was relentless in his use of the 
media to promote his cause.120 As Wanda Wiegers asserts, 
“newspaper accounts [of the case] constructed fatherhood 
exclusively in genetic terms”121 and rarely considered the rights 
of the birth mother or the abusive behavior of the father. 
Wiegers calls attention to the fact that “underlying much of the 
press coverage of the Saskatoon Dad case [is the assumption] 
that birth mothers have a moral duty to disclose their 
pregnancies to birth fathers.”122 This assumption must be 
contested.  
 
The facts of the case were straightforward. The mother 
had recently terminated a relationship with the genetic father at 
the time at which she became pregnant. However, “she did not 
consider him the father as he had always declared he was 
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unable to have children as a result of a 1977 industrial accident. 
Further complicating the picture was the fact that she had been 
intimate with other men at the relevant time.”123 The 
relationship between the parties had ended as the result of a 
“violent incident” and the mother “complained that Adam was 
controlling, insecure and generally neither emotionally nor 
mentally healthy.”124 Hendricks, who initially denied the 
violence, later admitted to such actions but blamed “his 
problematic relationship with Rose for prompting him to drink 
on the evening in question, all of which resulted in him striking 
Rose.”125 Neither the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, 
family division, nor the press commented that such victim-
blaming behavior is indicative of an abusive personality and 
would justify the mother in choosing not to inform the father 
with regard to her pregnancy.126  
 
The mother, identified in court proceedings as Rose 
Swan, had a history of substance abuse and limited financial 
resources and she knew, as the court put it, that “she was not in 
a position to provide her baby with a healthy, nurturing 
home.”127 Smith J. described her as “self-aware of her own 
failings” instead of evincing any contextualized understanding 
of the problems she faced as an Aboriginal woman in a society 
rife with colonialism.128 She wanted her child to be raised in an 
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environment that would honor her heritage. She wanted an 
open adoption so that she could have some contact with, and 
knowledge about, her child. With the help of her sister, who 
worked in a First Nations service agency, she hand selected an 
adoptive couple to parent her son. The social parents and Rose 
chose the child’s name together and showed all signs of 
cooperation and voluntariness.129 The mother endured a 
complicated and life-threatening pregnancy and gave the baby 
to the adoptive couple directly from the hospital. She exercised 
care and concern in her decisions for her child; nonetheless, her 
perspective, experiences, and concerns were effectively erased 
in legal reasoning and newspaper commentary.130  
 
After learning about the pregnancy and adoption 
placement, Hendricks acted immediately to assert his parental 
rights. He sought information from social service agencies, but 
“made little progress with the authorities. Perhaps this is not 
surprising as Adam presented as someone who was 
unacknowledged by the birth mother, nor did he have a current 
relationship with her. To the authorities, he was simply a male 
voice on the phone asserting paternity.”131 Once he had 
succeeded in locating the child, he initiated formal proceedings 
to establish his paternity and the court, having before it 
evidence that he was the genetic father, considered the relative 
parenting abilities of the genetic father and the adoptive 
parents. The court found that “Adam’s personal life may be 
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characterized as one of serial monogamy (more or less) with no 
commitment extending beyond three years. All the 
relationships have uneasy aspects, several of them deeply 
troubled.”132 His “experience with employment ha[d] also been 
somewhat eclectic”133 and had culminated in personal 
bankruptcy. He was described as “emotionally fragile.”134 The 
Turners, in contrast, were deemed to be financially and 
emotionally stable and committed to parenting.135 Ultimately, it 
was determined that the best interests of the child would be met 
by custody remaining with the adoptive parents.  
 
The terms of the decision, however, explicitly 
constructed the birth mother as a non-parent and erased the 
care and concern that had motivated her choice to release the 
child for adoption and her selection of the Turners as parents. 
In justifying denying Hendricks custody, Smith J. quoted the 
Supreme Court in King v. Low and asserted that “parental 
claims must not be lightly set aside and they are entitled to 
serious consideration in reaching any conclusion. Where it is 
clear that the welfare of the child requires it, however, they 
must be set aside.”136 But this is not a case in which “parental 
claims” were being “set aside.” The mother’s parental claim, 
although rendered invisible in the terms of the decision, is what 
should be viewed as being honored. It is only by constructing 
the mother’s actions as abandonment that she can be viewed as 
a non-parent. Smith J. also quoted Abella J.A. in determining 
that custody must be determined from the perspective of the 
child: “it is a mistake to look down at the child as a prize to be 
distributed, rather than from the child up to the parent as an 
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adult to be accountable.”137 This conveniently renders invisible 
the fact that considering the father at all is simply looking at 
this from the perspective of paternal ownership. The genetic 
father had no relationship with the child to be upheld. This case 
would undoubtedly have been appealed by Hendricks had he 
not been killed “in a [tragic] motor vehicle accident in August 
2007.”138 Given the ratio in Trociuk, the outcome of such an 
appeal would have been far from certain; Hendricks also 
suggests that it is inevitable that a newborn adoption case will 
eventually reach the Supreme Court.  
 
A 2009 case, heard in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, illustrates the more mundane dilemmas that pregnant 
women face even when genetic fathers are not violent. The 
mother hid the birth from the father and then claimed that he 
was not the father. His application was allowed in part because 
he had been deceived. The mother was determined to have 
given up her rights, but a hearing was to be held to determine 
custody/access as between the father and the adoptive 
parents.139 Although fathers’ rights groups would probably 
portray this case as a straight forward example of a man 
‘thwarted’ by a dishonest mother, the underlying facts of the 
case are much more complicated.  
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The father had been informed of the pregnancy. The 
parents had agreed upon an abortion, but the mother decided 
that she could not follow through with this decision. The father 
knew that she had not aborted, but did not show interest in her 
pregnancy or provide her with support, neither financial nor 
emotional. Because she also did not feel ready to be a parent 
(she was a university student at the time at which she became 
pregnant), and because the father had not been supportive, she 
told him that the child had been stillborn when in fact the child 
had been released for adoption.140 She was also unsure about 
paternity because she had been sexually assaulted at the time of 
the pregnancy, a fact that she had not disclosed to the father. 
The father learned through a third party (the maternal 
grandmother) that the child had been adopted. The mother then 
revealed to the father that she had been sexually assaulted at 
the time of conception and that she was not sure about 
paternity.141 Adoption proceedings were underway, with the 
child in a probationary placement, when the father filed his 
acknowledgement of paternity.142  
 
The Court found that “the essence of the father’s case 
is established, namely that she did deceive him by telling him 
the child was stillborn and in this way prevented him from 
asserting his paternity,” but did not contextualize the fact that 
the father had been adamant that the mother should abort. The 
court admitted that the father did not fall within the strict 
definition of a father as set out in the Children’s Law Reform 
Act.143 However, the father argued that the strict definition 
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should be avoided “by reference to principles of fundamental 
justice, including Charter values.”144 Although he did not 
explicitly raise a Charter argument, the father relied expressly 
on the ratio in Trociuk in asserting that the definition of ‘father’ 
“may be ripe for reconsideration.”145 Without an explicit 
constitutional challenge, however, the court did not decide the 
Charter issue.146 The mother asserted that if the adoption were 
to fail, she would prefer to seek custody herself rather than 
have the father obtain custody. But the court determined that 
she had no such right: “the adoption placement is vulnerable as 
to the father only and not as to the mother.”147 A new hearing 
was ordered in which the adoptive parents’ petition to dispense 
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with consent and the father’s custody claim would be heard on 
the same evidentiary basis to save time and money; the mother, 
however, would not have standing.148  
 
This case provides a clear example of why ‘show 
cause’ procedures, with regard to notification or investigations 
by the Children’s Aid Society and provisions to dispense with 
consent, would inevitably be inadequate.  It also suggests why 
mothers require sole rights over the infant. The father was not 
violent or abusive, although he was clearly unsupportive and 
manipulative, and the mother would not have had standing to 
exclude him. Yet his interference violates her reproductive 
autonomy, her dignity and her equality rights. He clearly chose 
parenthood only after his desire that the mother abort was 
thwarted. The mother felt herself unable to carry through with 
an abortion, but she also did not feel herself to be ready to raise 
a child on her own and she did not consider the father capable 
of raising the child himself. Had she known the outcome of 
these proceedings, she might have chosen abortion, whatever 
her own beliefs or feelings, and no woman should be forced 
into this position. The father clearly did not intend to procreate 
and recreational sexual relations should not entitle men to 
parental rights.149  
 
Yet fathers’ rights claims “have obtained considerable 
purchase in both the legal and popular culture,”150 and in a 
culture obsessed with DNA and genetic ancestry, the caring 
work of mothers in pregnancy (and of social parents as children 
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grow up) is given short shift.151 Fathers’ rights groups, many of 
which advance claims over children on the basis of genetics 
alone, are politically powerful.152 Fathers’ rights commentators 
assert that “to override the father’s long-term interest in 
bringing into the world a new life because of a nine-month 
physical burden on the mother is short-sighted.”153 
Considerable sympathy exists for the position of the so-called 
‘thwarted father’ who loses, through adoption, “any 
opportunity he might otherwise have had to know his child.”154 
But the potential loss for the father must be measured against 
the risks imposed on the mother. The rhetoric of many fathers’ 
rights groups invites “no inquiry at all into the conditions under 
which the woman became pregnant.”155 And legal 
commentators and supporters of fathers’ genetic rights often 
describe women who refuse to notify fathers as dishonest and 
“bent on duping … eager, yet unsuspecting, father[s].”156 But 
the mother has interests of her own at stake and too often 
women are afraid of societal or parental disapproval or the 
violence of former partners. It should be noted, as well, that 
women are particularly vulnerable to domestic violence when 
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pregnant, and when trying to leave relationships.157 The law has 
an obligation to protect such women, and their right to safety 
and self-determination over-rides the desire of men to ‘know’ 
children that they didn’t have any intention of fathering. The 
relationship between father and child is potential, not actual, 
and protecting that potential relationship comes at the price of 
disrespecting the actual relationship between the gestational 
mother and the child, and the considerable labor and risk of 
pregnancy. These cases beg the question: is a man a father 
simply by virtue of ejaculation? By upholding the de-
contextualized equality rights of unwed fathers, courts have 
violated the section 15 and section 7 rights of women. 
 
PART III: WOMEN’S SECTION 15 AND SECTION 7 
CHARTER RIGHTS  
 
As Nancy Erickson asserts, “for a man, by virtue of an 
accidental pregnancy, to get parental rights over the objection 
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of the pregnant woman in effect means that a woman who 
accidentally gets pregnant is deemed married to the source of 
the sperm for the purposes of decisions regarding the child.”158 
It is problematic that marriage is considered in law to be proof 
that a man is committed to parenthood;159 it is even more 
problematic to make an unmarried woman subject to the whims 
of a man who has no legal obligation to support or care for her, 
emotionally or financially, and who may, in fact, have treated 
her with serious disrespect, up to and including violence 
against her person. The ability of men to interfere in adoption 
placement, a fundamental component of reproductive freedom, 
violates women’s right to equality under section 15 by denying 
the historic discrimination against single mothers and their 
current economic vulnerability. Most women who contemplate 
adoption are disadvantaged, often in multiple ways, and as 
L’Heureux-Dube J. asserted in New Brunswick (Minister of 
Health and Community Services v. G. (J.) (1999) “New 
Brunswick”, “issues involving parents who are poor necessarily 
disproportionately affect women and therefore raise equality 
concerns and the need to consider women's perspectives.”160 
                                                
158  Supra note 7 at 455. It is ironic to note that in the case of sperm 
donation, the husband is deemed to be the legal father, not the donor. 
So, men who ejaculate into a cup can donate their sperm as a gift; 
they have no responsibility, despite an intention to procreate. But men 
who ejaculate into a woman, without intent to procreate, are deemed 
fathers nonetheless and thereby acquire rights that allow them to 
control the women with whom they have had sex. They cannot 
simply make a gift of their sperm if they give their sperm via 
intercourse. There are, however, recent challenges in Canada to the 
anonymity of sperm donation. See: Angela Cameron, Vanessa 
Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: 
Some Doubts and Directions” (2010) 26(1) Can J Fam L at 95.  
159  Adoption cases, like many issues related to unmarried cohabitation, 
should prompt us to question the rights that have been accorded to 
men in marriage.  
160  New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J) 
[JG], [1999] 3 SCR 46 at para 113 [New Brunswick]. 
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The court has failed abjectly in this regard. Single mothers, not 
men who have sired children out of wedlock, constitute a 
distinct minority subject to historical discrimination. As Hester 
Lessard cogently argues, fathers have not been subject to 
negative stereotypes or discrimination and formal equality 
analysis erases the long and painful history of discrimination 
against single mothers.161 The potential father’s contribution to 
conception is not equal to the contribution of the mother. 
Pregnancy is uncomfortable and involves weight gain, 
tiredness and, for some, nausea, restricted mobility and an 
increased risk of “medical problems like high blood pressure 
and diabetes.”162 Despite medical advances, pregnancy 
continues to create risk not only to the mother’s health, but also 
to her life.163 There is simply no comparison with “men who 
have ejaculated their sperm.”164 The mother who provides life, 
care, and economic support for a child for nine months is not 
similarly situated to the father of her child. At the time of birth, 
the gestational mother “is not only the primary caretaker 
parent, she is the only caretaker parent.”165 This assertion is not 
a retreat into essentialism. In fact, “ignoring the different 
biological positioning of birth mothers and fathers gives rise to 
the risk of reinforcing a cruder genetic essentialism, which 
suggests that genes are central to, and the most important part 
of, identity.”166 Nor is this acknowledgement of difference 
                                                
161  Lessard, supra note 108 at 202. 
162  Ruth Colker, “Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperms is Cheap, Eggs are 
Not”  (1996) 47 Hastings LJ 1063 at 1071.  
163  According to UNICEF, in Canada, as of 2005, the odds of maternal 
death remained 1 in 11,000. Although this risk is low, it is not 
insignificant: UNICEF, “Estimates of Maternal Mortality 2008”, 
online: <http:www.childinfo.org/maternal_mortality_countrydata.php 
>.   
164  Supra note 162 at 1071. 
165  Supra note 7 at 462.  




based on “false and pejorative associations” with regard to 
fathers or potential fathers;167 instead, formal equality analysis 
erases the history of discrimination against single mothers.168 
As consent to adoption cases reveal, single mothers have 
consistently been viewed with disrespect, more as a source of 
infants for infertile couples than as capable, loving mothers. 
Despite this fact, the equality rights of men, not women, have 
been upheld in adoption cases, delivering Charter equality with 
a vengeance. Mothers, moreover, are vulnerable to abuse 
during pregnancy and when trying to leave relationships, and 
forcing women to disclose pregnancies and include fathers in 
planning for children puts women at risk of abuse, a further 
violation of their equality rights and their rights to bodily 
integrity.  
 
Moreover, allowing men to intervene in adoption 
violates women’s section 7 rights to liberty and security of the 
person by interfering with women’s “physical and 
psychological integrity”169 with regard to the pregnancy itself. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld that “the right to 
liberty guaranteed under s.7 of the Charter gives a woman the 
right to decide for herself whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy,”170 but this right is meaningless if she is forced to 
reveal her pregnancy to an abusive father or to someone she 
simply does not want in her life, and to give him a voice in the 
disposition of the child. The fact that men do not have any right 
to intervene in the decision to abort was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1989. The argument of Guy 
Tremblay (himself an abusive man)171 that he had an interest in 
                                                
167  Supra note 106 at para 24.  
168  Lessard, supra note 108 at 202. 
169  Supra note 160 at para 58. 
170  R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at para 243.  
171  He was not only abusive of Daigle, but also of other women, and has 
subsequently been convicted of assault: R v Tremblay, 1999 ABQB 
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the fetus and could prevent his girlfriend’s abortion was based, 
like arguments regarding adoption notification, “on the 
proposition that the potential father’s contribution to the act of 
conception gives him an equal say in what happens to the 
fetus.”172 However, the Supreme Court confirmed that no man 
has a “right to veto a woman’s decision in respect to the fetus 
she is carrying.”173 Women are not obligated to tell men that 
they are pregnant, and can abort without interference. By slow 
degrees, however, legislatures and lower courts are coming to 
assert that the father can veto a woman’s decision with regard 
to the disposition of the child at birth. But “the pregnant 
woman needs to know that if she foregoes … her right to abort, 
the state will enforce her plans for the child’s future.”174 In 
Canada, a woman cannot feel certain that she will have such 
control. And this provides abusive men with yet another legal 
weapon with which to control women who are trying to protect 
themselves and their children. As Wilson J. noted in 1988, the 
right to control pregnancy “is an integral part of modern 
woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human 
being.”175 I would argue further that the right to control the 
disposition of the child at birth is integral to our struggles for 
dignity and autonomy. As the Supreme Court articulated in 
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), the 
liberty interest “is engaged where state compulsions or 
prohibitions affect important and fundamental life choices.”176 
Reproductive decisions – abortion and adoption – are certainly 
                                                                                           
992; R v Tremblay, 2003 ABCA 33; and R v Tremblay, [2004] SCCA 
No 359.  
172  Tremblay v Daigle, [1989] 2 SCR 5 at para 78. 
173  Ibid at para 79. 
174  Supra note 7 at 460. 
175  Supra note 170 at para 242.  
176  Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 




fundamental life choices. State interference, via the recognition 
of the uninvolved father as a parent, is unconstitutional. A 
woman’s section 7 rights to liberty and security of the person 
with regard to termination of pregnancy and disposition of the 
baby at birth through adoption must be considered while 
“[taking into] account the principles and purposes of the 
equality guarantee.”177 As L’Heureux-Dube J. asserted 
forcefully in New Brunswick, without such integrated analysis, 
our Constitution will not respond “to the realities and needs of 
all members of society.”178 Current law with regard to newborn 
adoption responds to the needs of men and denies the reality of 
women’s lives. Women who contemplate third party adoption 
still do so in a world in which their employment options are 
inferior to those of men and are compromised by childbirth and 
child-rearing;179 daycare is expensive and difficult to obtain;180 
the majority of childcare work, even in two-parent households, 
                                                
177  Supra note 160 at para 115. 
178  Ibid at para 115. 
179  For further information see: Pat Armstrong & Hugh Armstrong, The 
Double Ghetto: Canadian Women and their Segregated Work, 3d ed 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2010); Susan Boyd, Child 
Custody, Law and Women’s Work (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Judy Fudge, “The New Workplace: Surveying the Landscape” 
(2009) 23 Man LJ 131; Shelley Gavigan & Dorothy Chunn, “From 
Mothers’ Allowance to Mothers Need Not Apply: Canadian Welfare 
Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal Reforms” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 733; Revital Goldhar, “Restructuring Pay Equity – A Review of 
the Report ‘Pay Equity: A New Approach to a Fundamental Right’” 
(2004) 3 JL & Equality 137; and Lene Madson, “Citizen, Worker, 
Mother: Canadian Women’s Claims to Parental Leave and Childcare” 
(2002) 19 Can J Fam L 11. 
180  For further information see: Angela Campbell, “Proceeding with 
Care” (2006) 26 Can J Fam L 171; and Claire Young, “Child Care: A 
Taxing Issue” (1994) 3 McGill LJ 539. 
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is performed by women;181 stigma attaches to single female 
parenthood;182 and male partners can be abusive with 
impunity.183 In this context, both abortion and adoption remain 
essential reproductive options for women, options with which 
no man should have a right to interfere. Current law violates 
women’s rights to reproductive autonomy, their equality rights, 




This article has argued that the unfettered right to release a 
newborn child for third party adoption is an essential 
component of women’s reproductive autonomy. It is also 
essential to women’s dignity and equality rights. To force the 
mother to abide by the wishes of a father (who may be 
manipulative, controlling, or violent, or who may simply have 
been a disinterested and unsupportive party during the 
                                                
181  For further information see: Julie Brines, “Economic Dependency, 
Gender and the Division of Labor at Home” (1994) 100(3) American 
Journal of Sociology 652; Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift: 
Working Parents and the Revolution at Home (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 1989); and Meg Luxton, More Than a Labor of Love 
(Toronto: The Canadian Women’s Educational Press, 1980). 
182  For further information see: Susan Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers: 
Relational Theory and Parenting Apart” (2010) 18(2) Fem Legal 
Studies 127; Nancy Dowd, “Stigmatizing Single Parents” (1994) 18 
Women’s LJ 19; and Hester Lessard, “The Empire of the Lone 
Mother: Parental Rights, Child Welfare Law and State Restructuring” 
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 717. 
183  For further information see: Martha Davis & Susan Kraham, 
“Protecting Women’s Welfare in the Face of Violence” (1955) 22 
Fordham Urb LJ 114; Clark Anthony Drumbl, “Civil, Constitutional 
and Criminal Justice Responses to Female Partner Abuse: Proposals 
for Reform” (1994) 12 Can J Fam L 115; Melanie Randall, “Sexual 
Assault in Spousal Relationships: ‘Continuous Consent’ and the 




pregnancy) is to force her to become a breeding machine for a 
man she does not want in her life. I do not dispute, in fact I 
celebrate, the capacity of fathers to nurture and care for 
children. However, this capacity should be exercised, at the 
time of birth, through the choice of the mother, as a result of 
cooperation and of supportive behavior on the part of the 
father. The “father’s experience of parenthood as genetic 
contribution (achieved through sexual intercourse)” is not 
comparable to the mother’s far more significant role over the 
nine-month period of gestation and childbirth.184 Ejaculation 
cannot be equated with fatherhood. But carrying a pregnancy to 
term is acting as a mother. In this context “it [is] appropriate to 
vest the gestational mother with sole parental status.”185 In 
recognition of the nine months of pregnancy, and of the 
mother’s settled intention to parent, the gestational mother, 
even in the context of legal marriage, should have sole control 
over the fate of the newborn child.186 After all, a married father 
                                                
184  Supra note 119 at para 18. 
185  Katharine Baker, “Bargaining or Biology: The History and Future of 
Paternity Law and Parental Status” (2004) 14 Cornell JL & Pub Pol’y 
1 at 47 [Baker]. 
186  As Nancy Polikoff has eloquently asserted, there are also risks 
inherent in this strategy and we must acknowledge “a larger social 
context of male indifference to the consequences of sexual 
intercourse and male irresponsibility for the economic well-being of 
the children they sire. What I envision as a method of liberating 
women and children from the control of men and of recognizing the 
legitimacy of deliberate childrearing without fathers, men might see 
as a method of solidifying sexual access to women with impunity and 
of eliminating unwanted financial obligations for children. What one 
woman considers the freedom to create the family structure she 
wishes, another may view as coercion into an arrangement that leaves 
her with no buffer against either relative or absolute poverty:” Nancy 
Polikoff, “The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: 
Is It an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?” (1996) 36 
Santa Clara L Rev 375 at 376. In this context, expansion of funded 
childcare and reform of employment law remain essential.  
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could also be manipulative, violent, or simply unsupportive. 
The mother can, and most times will, choose to welcome a co-
parent into the emergent family at the time of birth, through 
birth registration, cohabitation and/or the commencement of a 
relationship between the baby and a third party, who need not 
be the genetic father.187 But she must also have the right to 
exclude the genetic father, whatever his legal relationship to 
her. This is essential to her potential safety, and the well-being 
of her child.188 The mother must also be able to choose to 
relinquish her own claim on the child, and to transfer parental 
rights and responsibilities to a third party or parties, without the 
interference of the genetic father.189 To allow a man to interfere 
                                                
187 Post-birth “intent, as manifested, implicitly or explicitly, in an 
agreement with the primary caretaker, would be the critical factor in 
determining parental rights and obligations as the child grows:” supra 
note 185 at 62. 
188  Clearly, this raises a risk that an unpleasant mother will simply 
exclude a well-meaning man for personal reasons that are offensive to 
most people. However, this risk must be accepted as part of the 
balancing of the rights of mothers, fathers and children. The much 
greater risks involved for mothers ensure that her rights (and 
obligations) must be paramount.  
189  There are other reasons why such a regime makes sense: it would 
make fatherhood a volitional status; it would severe the link between 
sexual activity and reproduction; and it would provide equal 
parenting rights for gay and lesbian couples by allowing an 
immediate opt-in for a co-parent. Moreover, the emphasis on genetics 
in adoption cases is in contradiction to many other developments in 
the law of parenting: you can terminate paternal rights voluntarily 
without penalty; artificial insemination awards paternity to men who 
are known not to be genetic fathers; and, social fathers can be held 
responsible for child support whatever their genetic status with regard 
to children they have raised. For a full development of this argument, 
see Baker, supra note 185. For an extended argument with regard to 
the right of the same-sex co-parent to adopt, when the mother so 
wishes, see: Christine Metteer Lorillard, “Placing Second-Parent 




in this life-changing decision vitiates a woman’s right to 
equality and undermines her liberty and security of the person. 





                                                                                           
Protected Family Rights” (2008) 30(1) Women’s Rts L Rep 1 . For 
further information on the obligations of stepparents, see: Carol 
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